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STATE OF UTAH
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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the Coillrt below.
Plaintiff in its brief has set forth the lease upon
which the case is based and has also set out its version
of the facts. In the main, the defendant agrees with the
statement, but not with the conclusions interspersed
therein, and there have been some omissions.
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On page 11 of plaintiff's brief:
"that Bradley-Badger stored some merchandise in the store, but no rent was paid by them."
This short

state~nent

by plaintiff disregards the

eviction of defendant and the taking possession of the
premises by the plaintiff shortly after July 25, 1952,
which was the date the defendant vacated the store
(R. 49).
Let's look at the record:

"Q. And did you permit Badger-Bradley to
store any merchandise in these premises during
this period of time ~
"A.

Yes, they stored some things ; not much.

"Q. And that arrangmnent took place shortly after the defendant vacated these premises, did
it not~
"A.

It wasn't long after." (R. 51)

The plaintiff has listed in its brief six points, and
for the sake of clarity, the defendant will answer the
arguments on the points as they appear in plaintiff's
brief. After that the defendant, as cross-appellant, will
present its one point upon which its cross-appeal is

'(

I

based, that is, that the trial court erred in awarding the
plaintiff $300.00 for damages to plaintiff's premises (R.
164).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN SUSTAINING THE OBJECTION TO THE QUESTION
WHICH IS SET OUT IN PLAINTIFF'S POINT 1.
Harold G. Cutler, president and general manager
of the plaintiff corporation, was asked if he had received a hid for the repair of the :building, to which he responded that he had received one bid. He was then asked what was the amount of that bid. ( R. 78) The lower
court sustained the objection to the question upon the
ground that it was hearsay.

Nichols' Applied Evidence, Vol. 3, page 2436:
'
"Testimony on knowledge
gained solely frmn
a letter or a statement received from another is
hearsay.

''The ultimate test as to whether a statement
is hearsay is whether the witness may be crossexamined concerning the fact about which he
testifies."
The writers have examined with interest the insert from Jones Commentories on Evidence, 2d ed., Vol.
2, page 1325. There is no question as to the statement
cited in their brief on page 20, however, the citation nor
any part of it implies that hearsay evidence may be used
to prove what a com.petent man would charge for that
service. The competent man should have been subpoe-
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naed, testified and subjected himself to cross-examina~
tion. We will quote from Jones Commentaries on Evidence, 2d ed., Vol. 2, page 1325, the paragraph just preceding that quoted by the apepllant:
"Personal service. (In General). With regard
to personal service rendered without any agreement as to the amount to be charged for them,
inasmuch as the law implies that they are to be
paid for at a reasonable rate, it is manifest that
some means must exist for giving evidence of that
rate to the court. The mode of conveying it has led
to several nice distinctions, for while the plaintiff may produce testimony of the nature of the
service and the necessary qualifications for it and
the value put upon it by witnesses competent to
estimate its worth, bare evidence of usual or
probable charges, by others or the plaintiff himself, leads to collateral issues and renders such
testimony inadmissruble.
"The proper method is to produce evidence
of the price which a competent man would charge
for that particular service, or has charged for
similar services."
See: 31 C. J. S., page 919, et seq.
The plaintiff has not been able to show that t h e
hearsay answer called for came within the exceptions to
the hearsay rule. Mr. Cutler was not asked if he was familiar with what the cost of repairs would be. The question did not call for Mr. Cutler's knowledge; it merely
called for a hearsay statement n1ade to him by a third
party, and naturally it was inad1nissable· when objected
to upon the grounds of hearsay.
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See:
State Bank of Beaver Co. v. Hollingshead,
25 P(2) 612, 82 U. 416;
Eaglin v. Earl Eagle Mining Co.,
184 P. 190, 5-± U. 572.
The plaintiff failed to prove any damage to the
building by any competent evidence.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR AND WAS
JUSTIFIED IN ITS FINDING NO. 7, THAT IN SEPTEMBER,, 1952, THE PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED AND
TOOK POSSESSION OF SAID DEMISED PREMISES FOR ITS SOLE USE AND PURPOSE.
On July 25, 1951, the plaintiff was served with a
written notice (Exhibit D-2) whereby the defendant
tendered possession of the leased premises to the plaintiff and returned the keys of said premises to the plaintiff (R. 49). Shortly thereafter, according to the testimony of Harold G. Cutler, plaintiff's president and general manager, the plaintiff permitted Badger-Bradley
Company to store merchandise on s a i d premises rent
free; it leased said premises to a political organization
for a period of ten days from October 20, 1952, to N ovember 4, 1952; it placed ''For Lease" signs in the front store
windows of the premises ; it advertised said premises ''for
rent" in Salt Lake City newspapers; and it leased the
premises for a period of five years to Badger-Bradley
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Company at a rental of $575.00 per month commencing
May 1, 1953, anJ possession was given to the new lessee
on March 1, 1953. All of the' foregoing, according to Mr.
Cutler, was done without any notice to defendant and
without the latter's knowledge or consent (R. 50-51).
Under the authorities this constituted a surrender
as a matter of law, thereby discharging the lessee defendant from further liability under the lease. We quote from
Tiffany on Real Property, 3d ed., Section 962:
"A second mode of surrender by operation of
law, and one which frequently occurs, results from
the relinquishment of possession by the tenant
and the resumption of possession by the landlord.
The theory of such surrender would seem to be
that the, reverting of possession in the landlord
to the exclusion of the tenant, by the action of
both parties, being inconsistent with the continuance of an outstanding leasehold in the tenant,
both are estopped to assert that the relation of
landlord and tenant still exists. It is immaterial
whether such change of possession is the result
of agreement. The tenant may relinquish possession to the landlord in accordance with an agreement to that effect, but more frequently the
change of possession occurs as a result of the
abandonment of the premises by the tenant and
the subsequent resumption of the possession
thereof by the landlord."
See also:
Enoch C. Richards v. Libby, (_l\Iaine ), 10
Atl. (2) 609; 126 ALR 1215;
Baker v. Eilers Music Co. (Dist. Ct. of
App., Calif., 1915) 146 P. 1056;
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Rehkoph v. \Virz (Calif. 1916), 161
P. 285;
Willis v. Kronendonk, 58 U. 592, 200
P. 1025;
Casper Natl. Bank v. Curry (Wyo.)
65 P(2) 1117.
The Utah Supreme Court, In the case of Willis v.
Kronendonk, supra, cited with approval the California
cases, and stated:
"Assuming, however, t h a t there had been
1nerely an abandonment of the pre1nises by the
defendant, then the result, in view of the undisputed facts, \Vould still have to be the same. As
pointed out in the case cited from California,
where a tenant abandons the premises, and the
landlord unconditionally goes in t o possession
thereof and treats them as though the tenancy
had expired, it amounts to a surrender, and the
landlord cannot thereafter recover any rent, nor
sue for damages. If he desires to reserve that
right, he must recognize the tenant's rights in the
premises for the unexpired term, and sue hhn for
damages upon his breach of covenant to pay rent.
This, however, is elementary doctrine."
A very recent case, Roger Belanger, et al. v. Lester
Rice, ________ U. --------, ________ P () --------, Case No. 8125 in the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, this court held a
surrender took place where the lessor accepted a new
tenant for a period of eight days and lessee paid the advertising costs.
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The foregoing mnply justify the court's Finding No.
7, that plaintiff accepted and took possession of said demises premises for its sole use and purposes in September, 1952. The defendant urges that the court could
have found that the surrender took place on July 25,
1952, the date plaintiff accepted the keys and possession of said premises. That the plaintiff took possession
and exercised exclusive dominion thereof shortly after
July 25th is admitted. The trial court apparently construed the statement, ''shortly thereafter,'' as meaning a
lapse of the period of time extending from July 25, 193:2,
to September 30, 1952, and awarded plaintiff a judgment
for rents at the rate of $400.00 a month for the 1nonths
of July, August and September.
POINT III.
T HE TRIAL C 0 U R T WAS JU STIFIED IN
FAILING TO FIND THAT DEF·ENDANT AGREED
TO REMAIN OBLIGATED TO PAY THE RENT ON
THE D·EMISED PRE1IISES UNTIL A NEW LEASE
COULD BE RECEIVED.
1

The claim that plaintiff should recover on some
promise or assurance or agreement to remain obligated
to pay the rent on the premises until a new lease could
be obtained was not urged in the pleadings, nor did
plaintiff request a finding to that effect. It is a new
theory cast into the case after it had left the jurisdiction of the trial court. 1Ir. Solomon, a witness, testified
as is material to the this point:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"A. The purpose of the conference was to
advise :Mr. Harold Cutler, President of the John
C. Cutler Association, that DeJ'ay Stores were interested in negotiating a new lease and location at
317 South Main Street, and that they had been
conducting a business at 36 South :Main Street at
a loss; that they had purchased certain fixtures
from the Salt Lake Knit which Mr. Cantor represented were paid for and belonged to DeJay
Stores, and that they wanted to move these fixtures to their new location at the earliest possible date, but 1\fr. Cantor advised ~lr. Cutler that
they in no way intended to discontinue recognizing their responsibility on the lease, and the payments would he made in accordance with the
terms of the lease." (R. 103)
"The conclusion of the visit that we had was
that it was satisfactory with the Cutlers for DeJay Stores to move to the new location, and Mr.
Harold Cutler expressed a willingness to help us,
cooperate in seeing if we could find another tenant, a sub-tenant, a sublease of the property, and
I repeat that I had no impression that DeJ ay
Stores in any way considered they were getting
out of their lease; they had every intention of taking the responsibility of making the payments,
and so advised Mr. Cutler." (R. 10-t)
The above conversation was prior to the time that
plaintiff took possession and effected surrender of the
property. (See defendant's argument under Point 2.)
This appears to be immaterial. The plaintiff sued on the
lease and not on any promise, direct or implied. The eviction of the defendant shortly after July 25, 1952, relieved
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the defendant of all written promises contained in the
lease, and naturally all oral and implied promises claimed by the plaintiff.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT VvAS JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF DAMAGES FOR
$1,725.00, REAL ESTATE BROKER'S COMI\IISSION.
The court found in its Finding No. 7 (R. 164) that
there had been a surrender in September, 1952, and that
the plaintiff had taken possession of the premises. It
naturally follows that from then on the defendant owed
the plaintiff no duty whatsoever, either as to payment
of rentals or expense in securing new tenants.
POINT V.
TI-IE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING TO AWARD THE PLAINTIFF JUDG I\1:ENT
FOR RENTALS AFTER SEPTEI\fBER, 1952.
Under this point the plaintiff has urged, as it did in
its argument (plaintiff's brief, pages 16-18), that the defendant had no right to defend this action because of the
provisions of Section 16-8-3, Utah CoO.e Annotated, 1953,
on account of defendant's failure to comply with Sections 16-8-1 and 16-8-2, U. C. A. 1953.
The plaintiff's brief plays upon the word, "transactions." Plaintiff has quoted cases that in the defendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ant's opinion have no bearing on the situation. Plaintiff's
contention that it is entitled to practically a default judgment is not upheld by this court:
Clawson v. Boston Acme J.Vlines Development
Co., 72 U. 137, 269 P. 147, 59 A.L.R. 1318:

"The Utah statute, section 947, only prohibits
a noncomplying corporation from prosecuting or
maintaining any action, suit, counterclaim, or
cross-complaint in any court of the state. It does
not prohibit such corporation from defending an
action brought against it."
The court goes on to say:
"There is much force in the contention of appellant that to deprive even a foreign corporation
of the right to defend against an action brought
against it would savor strongly of unconstitutionality. We doubt if that would be true as to the defense of the statute of li1nitations, but even as to
such defense, it would seem that such corporation
is entitled to it, where there is no express statute
withholding the right."
11 he above case was quoted and followed with ap-

proval in the case of Ea.rle v. Froedtcrt Grain & Maltin,g
Co. (Sup. Ct. Wash., 1938), 85 P(2) 264.

Yol. :2:3, Am. Jur., page 313:
"Such a statute does not prevent the corporation from defending an action brought against it
in the state courts, unless, as in some jurisdictions
the statute contains a provision expressly prohibiting it from defending in any suit."
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Of interest also is Heyl v. Beadel (Sup. Ct.
Iowa, 1940), 29-1 N. \V. 335, 130 A.L.R.
994 and annotation.

POINT VI.
r:rHE COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN REFUSING
TO AWARD JUDGl\lENT AGAINST DEFENDANT
FOR $600.00 FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES.
As stated in plaintiff's brief, page 3:2, it was stipulated that the court determine the amount of attorneys'
fees to award plaintiff without calling witnesses. This
stipulation was suggested by the attorney for plaintiff
and acquiesced in by the attorney for defendant (R. 77).
The court fixed the fees at $300.00. That the court is an
expert in his own right to determine fees requires no
bolstering of authority. The court could accept or reject the testimony of experts as to the value of the services of an attorney. It seems incongruous that the plaintiff should request the court to make the detennination
of the attorneys' fees, and then object because it felt it
should receive twice as 1nuch. There is certai~ly nothing in the record that suggests that $300.00 is an abuse of
discretion by the court.

I

DEFENDANT'S CROSS-APPEAL

}

POINT I

I
I
I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN A\VARDING
THE PLAINTIFF $300.00 F 0 R DAMAGES TO
PLAINTIFF'S PRE1'.1ISES (R. 164).
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As appears frmn the argument on Point 2 in this
brief, there was absolutely no competent evidence upon
which the court could find that the plaintiff had suffered damage to its property in the sum of $300.00 or any
other smn. This arbitrary figure of $300.00 was not supported by the evidence of any witness and it would have
been so easy had the plaintiff really suffered damage, to
have brought in any number of competent witnesses to
inform the court as to the amount of damage, if any had
been done to plaintiff's premises.
CONCLUSION

The defendant feels that it has fully answered
plaintiff's brief, and that this court should sustain the
findings of the lower court in every particular, except
as to the $300.00 awarded to plaintiff for damage to the
premises, which was the basis of defendant's cross-appeal, and as to that $300.00 award, the lower court's
judgment should be reversed, and that the defendant
should be awarded its costs.
Respectfully submitted.
SAMUEL BERNSTEIN
RAYS. McCARTY
Attorneys for Reszwndent
and Cross-Appellant.
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